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Abstract 
This paper describes a usability study of the Nedap 
voting machine in the Netherlands. On the day of the 
national elections, 566 voters participated in our study 
immediately after having cast their real vote. The 
research focused on the correspondence between voter 
intents and voting results, distinguishing between 
usability (correspondence between voter intents and 
voter input) and machine reliability (correspondence 
between voter input and machine output). For the sake 
of comparison, participants also cast their votes using a 
paper ballot. 
 
The machine reliability appeared to be 100%, indicating 
that, within our sample, all votes that had been cast 
were correctly represented in the output of the voting 
machine. Regarding usability, 1.4% of the participants 
had cast the wrong vote using the voting machine. This 
percentage was similar to that of the paper ballot.  
 
Practical implications as well as experiences with this 
type of usability testing are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Although electronic voting systems have many obvious 
advantages compared to the traditional paper ballots, 
there is a vivid debate going on about the use of voting 
machines in elections. Most of these discussions focus 
on the trustworthiness of voting systems (Arbaugh, 
2004; Di Franco, Petro, Shear & Vladimirov, 2004; 
Lauer, 2004; Simons, 2005). They either address the 
effects of potential software bugs (safety) or the 
vulnerability of voting machines to fraud attempts 
(security) (Pieters, 2006).  
 
However, these are not the only important issues. For 
voters, casting a vote using a voting machine will be a 
far less transparent process than voting with a paper 
ballot. In a paper-and-pencil election, voters can easily 
verify their vote on the ballot, see how their ballot is 
cast in a box, and imagine how election officials will 
manually count all votes. In an election using voting 
machines, they must trust that basically the same 
things happen. ‘Vendors and election officials are free 
to claim that elections have gone “smoothly,” when 
there is, in fact, no evidence the votes counted had 
anything to do with the intent of the voters’ (Dill, 
Schneier & Simons, 2003).  
 
A survey by Herrnson et al. (2005), including a 
usability test, a field study, and an exit poll, underlines 
these concerns. Voters were predominantly satisfied 
about the various aspects of voting machines (81-93% 
positive), but there were also participants with negative 
experiences. For instance, 6% of the participants in the 
exit poll reacted negatively to the statement, “I am 
confident that my vote was actually recorded,” and 
another 8% expressed at least some doubts in this 
respect. These voters leave the polling station without 
knowing for certain whether or not they have actually 
participated in the democratic process of voting.  
 
Usability is an important aspect of voting equipment, as 
well (Bederson et al., 2003; Norden, Creelan, Kimball & 
Quesenbery, 2006). Voting materials, whether they are 
paper ballots or voting machines, must enable voters to 
effectively and efficiently cast their vote. Earlier 
experiences, most notably the Florida 2000 elections, 
show that we cannot just rely on existing voting 
equipment. Roth (1998) evaluated the usability of 
several voting systems, and uncovered various 
important usability problems. Even though the voting 
equipment has evolved since then, a recent study by 
Conrad et al. (2006) showed that people still may make 
mistakes when they use a voting machine to cast their 
vote. They also came across substantial differences in 
usability between four voting machines. Interestingly, 
they found a significant (albeit weak) correlation 
between the usability of the voting system and voters’ 
confidence that their vote was accurately counted. 
 
In this paper, we will report on the design and results 
of a study into the quality of the Nedap voting machine, 
as used in the Dutch national elections (see Figure 1). 
We will not address security and safety issues, but 
instead focus on the question whether the voting 
machine helps users to effectively cast the vote of their 
choice. Two different aspects of this overall question 
are distinguished: the usability of the voting machine 
(the question whether the voting machine’s input 
accurately represents the voting intentions) and 
machine reliability (the question whether the voting 
machine’s output accurately represents the voters’ 
input). To interpret the usability results, we asked 
 182 
 
participants to cast their votes twice: both using the 
voting machine and using a paper ballot. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Nedap voting machine 
 
Dutch elections and the voting machine 
Before describing the design and results of our study, 
we will first provide some background information 
about the Dutch elections and the voting machine used. 
In the national elections in the Netherlands, voters are 
normally assumed to only cast one vote: they have to 
select one candidate from the candidate list. This 
candidate is a member of one of the participating 
political parties. 
 
The Nedap voting machine presents voters with a list of 
candidates for all participating parties. The political 
parties can be found in the upper row; the names of 
the candidates in the columns below the names of each 
political party. The party’s top candidate (‘lijstttrekker’) 
can be found in the number one row.  
 
Voters have to select one candidate name and press 
that particular button. After that, their vote intention is 
displayed on a small LCD screen. If the vote that is 
displayed is correct, voters can cast their actual vote by 
pressing a red button. If the vote displayed is not the 
right one, voters can push a button to correct their vote 
and start anew.  
 
Method and Process 
Selker, Rosenzweig & Pandolfo (2006) stress the 
importance of ecological validity for usability research 
of voting equipment. In our study, we tried to stay as 
close to a normal election as possible. The research 
took place on the day of the national elections for the 
Dutch parliament on November 22, 2006. The town hall 
of Enschede served as the research location. In total, 
more than 1800 voters visited the town hall that day to 
cast their votes. Of this group, 566 people participated 
in our study (31%). All participants were subject to the 
following protocol.  
 
Step 1: Casting the real vote 
The participants in our study were people who actually 
came to vote on November 22. Posters announcing the 
research were placed at the entrance of the town hall. 
The posters explained that voters could be asked to 
participate in a study. To avoid interference with real 
voting behavior, recruitment started when people left 
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the polling station. In the real elections, all voters had 
cast their vote using the Nedap voting machine. 
 
Step 2: Recruitment of participants 
Voters who left the polling station were randomly 
approached by a research assistant (recognizable as 
such by a university badge) and asked to participate in 
a study into the user-friendliness of voting equipment. 
They were told that the research would take a few 
minutes and that they would have a chance to win one 
of six € 50 gift certificates. Especially during peak hours 
at the polling station not all voters could be 
approached. 
 
Step 3: Research outline 
Voters who agreed to participate were guided to a 
separate room in the town hall where a polling station 
was simulated. They were given a brief outline of the 
research procedure. It was explained to them that they 
had to cast a vote once more, and that they had to do 
this using the voting machine and a paper ballot. The 
designs of the candidate lists on the voting machine 
and on the paper ballot were exactly the same as those 
used in the official elections. The candidate list used in 
our study, too, consisted of real candidate names and 
real political parties. We emphasized, however, that the 
votes in the study were ‘fake’ and that the research had 
nothing to do with the real elections.  
 
Step 4: Voting task 
Participants received a form with a participant number 
and three demographic questions (gender, age, and 
educational level) which they would have to fill out 
afterwards. A researcher instructed the participants 
that they had to cast their votes vote on a pre-specified 
candidate. The voting assignment consistently included: 
(a) the name of the candidate, (b) the political party to 
which the candidate belonged, and (c) the candidate’s 
number on the list of the political party. Translated 
from Dutch, the instruction was: 
 
‘Your goal is to vote for [first name plus family 
name candidate]. This person is number [#] on 
the list of [name of the political party].’  
 
As participants were supposed to memorize their voting 
task, we repeated this instruction, and asked if their 
voting task was clear to them. This was also one of the 
reasons why we added the candidate’s number on the 
list of their political party: the redundant information 
would probably help them remember the voting task. 
Furthermore, for some of the candidates, the number 
on the list is something which voters may know. 
 
Because we wanted the study to cover all possible 
voting options, all participants were given different 
voting tasks. Participant 2, for instance, had to vote for 
the second person on the first list, participant 3 for the 
third person of the first list, and so forth. In this way, 
all participants were given a unique voting task, and all 
voting possibilities were included in the research. After 
the instructions, participants were guided to the place 
with the voting machine and the ballots. 
 
Step 5: Voting 
The participants were first either referred to the voting 
machine or to the voting ballot. The order of votes 
(machine vs. ballot) was systematically varied, based 
on participant number. The first 25 participants used 
the voting machine first and then the ballot, the next 
25 participants started with the ballot and then used 
the voting machine, and so on.  
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To check whether the participants voted correctly on 
paper, all ballots were marked with participant 
numbers. To check whether the participants voted 
correctly using the voting machine, and to compare the 
input and output of the voting machine, a small video 
camera was installed, which recorded all participant 
actions with the voting machine. The camera was 
unobtrusively placed 3 feet above the display. 
 
Step 6: End of session 
When the participants had cast their votes using the 
voting machine and on paper, they were asked to fill 
out and hand in their short form with demographic 
questions. If the participants wanted to have chance to 
win one of the gift certificates they were asked to write 
their contact information on a separate list. 
 
Results 
 
Sample 
Not all participants answered all demographic 
questions. Relatively many participants overlooked the 
question about gender (107), fewer participants did not 
answer the questions about age (23) and educational 
level (41). Of the participants who answered the 
question about gender, 56% were male and 44% 
female. The participants’ age varied from 18 to 89 
years old (mean age: 40). Compared to the Dutch 
general population, highly educated people were over-
represented in the sample: 65% of the participants had 
a university or higher vocational education level, 7% 
had an intermediate level, and 28% had a lower level 
of education. 
 
Usability of voting machine vs. ballot 
In 44 of all 1132 cases (4%) a deviation between 
voting task and actual vote occurred. However, the 
types of errors and the causes differ and are not all 
practically meaningful. Table 1 presents all deviations, 
along with a brief explanation. 
 
Table 1. Voting problems and possible causes 
 Machine Ballot 
Personal/situational mistakes 12 11
Practical research problems 4   3
Usability problems   9   6
 
The first two categories of problems can be seen as 
comments to the research design rather than as 
problems with the voting equipment. 
 
Most of the deviations we found between the voting 
assignment and the actual votes must be attributed to 
personal/situational mistakes. Participants had trouble 
remembering their voting task and as a result voted for 
the wrong candidate. Two indicators for this type of 
errors were the consistency between the deviation on 
the voting ballot and the voting machine (participants 
made the same mistake twice) and the distance 
between the voting assignment and the actual vote 
(the mistake could not be caused by incorrect reading 
of the rows or columns).  
 
In five of the cases, participants appeared to have 
voted twice for the candidate and party of their own 
preference (like they had done somewhat earlier in the 
real elections): their two votes had nothing to do with 
the voting assignment. In three cases, participants 
voted for the first candidate of a party’s list, and forgot 
to vote for a candidate lower on the list. In two cases, 
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participants seemed to vote for random candidates who 
had nothing to do with the voting assignment. One 
participant appeared to mix up the list number and the 
candidate number: instead of voting for candidate 
number 8 of list 1, this participant voted for candidate 
number 1 of list 8. In one case, a verbalization of the 
participant (on the camera recording) showed that the 
participant had forgotten the candidate number: on 
paper, he correctly voted for candidate number 73 of 
list 2; before using the voting machine, he said that he 
had to vote for candidate number 74 of the same list, 
and acted accordingly.  
 
Practical research problems were the cause of another 
six deviations we found between voting assignments 
and actual votes. All these deviations occurred due to 
the sometimes hectic research context or to the 
artificial research situation of having to vote twice. The 
video recordings showed that one of the participants 
tried to cast a vote with the voting machine, which was 
not stored. This could happen because the voting 
machine was not released by one of the research 
assistants. Another deviation was caused by a 
difference in length between the candidate lists on the 
ballot and on the voting machine. When using the 
ballot, one participant noticed that his candidate was 
located in the first column, on the third row from 
below. He took the same strategy when using the 
voting machine, not noticing that the candidate was 
someone else. Another participant refused to vote both 
using the ballot and using the voting machine. Finally, 
one participant voted incorrectly twice, because he was 
misled by a wrong voting instruction by one of the 
research assistants. 
 
The last (and most important) category of deviations 
consists of usability problems. Regarding the paper 
ballots, six deviations were likely to correspond with 
usability problems (1.1%). Regarding the voting 
machine, nine such deviations occurred (1.6%). The 
difference between these percentages was not 
statistically significant. Even though the number of 
usability problems appeared to be rather low in our 
sample, it is important to pay serious attention to 
them, since it is at the heart of the democratic process 
that each and every voter is able to cast the vote of his 
or her choice. 
 
One of the participants, who had a severe physical 
handicap (spasticity), was not able to cast his vote with 
both types of voting equipment. With the paper ballot, 
he could not vote at all. With the voting machine, he 
only managed to cast a random vote. In the real 
elections, this voter had been helped by someone to 
cast his vote. The voting machine used was not 
specifically designed to be accessible. 
 
Figure 2. Layout of the voting machine’s candidate list  
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The rest of the usability problems, both with the ballot 
and with the voting machine, involved participants’ 
misreadings of rows and columns in the lists of parties 
and candidates. Apparently, the layout did not 
sufficiently support the voting task (see Figures 2 and 
3). The design did not prevent all voters from selecting 
the wrong row or column. This is something to pay 
serious attention to, since two adjacent columns may 
imply votes for very different political ideals. 
Figure 3. Layout of the paper ballot’s candidate list  
 
One of the participants made the same reading error 
using the paper ballot and the voting machine. The 
other participants only made their reading error once: 
four of them with the paper ballot, and seven with the 
voting machine. The strongest signal for a usability 
problem is if participants make the mistake in their first 
voting attempt and after that vote correctly in their 
second attempt. In those cases, the influence of 
memory problems between the first and the second 
vote can be ruled out. Three of the four participants 
who made a mistake using the paper ballot did this in 
their first attempt, and after that voted correctly using 
the voting machine. Only two of the seven participants 
who made a mistake using the voting machine did this 
in their first attempt. 
 
Machine reliability 
Using the video camera recordings, it was possible to 
compare the actual voting input with the output of the 
voting machine. Since the voting machine does not 
produce output that allows us to see which voter had 
cast which vote, we could only compare the totals of 
the voting input and the output of the voting machine 
with each other. There appeared to be a 100% 
correspondence between the votes that were cast by 
the participants and the election result produced by the 
voting machine. Based on these findings, the voting 
machine used can be characterized as entirely reliable 
within our sample. More research would be needed to 
generalize these findings to the entire population of 
Nedap voting machines. It must also be noted that we 
only tested the voting machine under normal 
circumstances; we did not include any safety or 
security threats in the research design. 
 
Discussion  
The user research reported in this article casts little 
doubt about the validity of the Dutch elections. Both 
with the ballot and with the voting machine, the vast 
majority of the participants appeared to be able to 
successfully complete their voting assignment. The 
results about the machine reliability are also positive, 
although it is important to stress that only one voting 
machine was included in the research. 
 
In the literature on usability testing, there is a strong 
emphasis on the detection and diagnosis of possible 
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user problems. The usability study reported in this 
article put forward two concerns: (a) the ballot and the 
voting machine (at least this version of the voting 
machine) may not be suitable for voters with (severe) 
physical handicaps, and (b) the rows and columns 
structure used on the ballot and on the interface of the 
voting machine might benefit from a redesign. 
 
Even though the numbers of problems detected in our 
usability test are far from spectacular, it remains highly 
useful to conduct this type of user research. First and 
foremost, it is a way of monitoring the validity of 
elections. Instead of relying on the voting equipment 
available, we empirically and rigorously checked its 
user-friendliness. Another advantage is that the results, 
if favorable, may be used to further the general public’s 
trust in the voting equipment used. The results clearly 
show that people can effectively cast their vote using 
the ballot and the voting machine, and that the ‘black 
box’ of a voting machine indeed does what it is 
supposed to do: record all votes that were cast, and 
produce the correct election results. 
 
Of course, it must be acknowledged that we are talking 
about a specific type of usability test in this article. 
Instead of focusing on detailed experiences of a very 
limited sample of potential users—for instance using 
think-aloud protocols—we drew a much larger sample, 
and only analyzed their observable behaviors. In terms 
of evaluation functions, we prioritized the verification 
function (getting an overall indication of the usability of 
the voting machine), and paid less attention to the 
troubleshooting function (getting an exhaustive list of 
potential user problems in need of revision) (cf. De 
Jong and Schellens, 1997). It is conceivable that a 
think-aloud usability test would result in more fine-
grained suggestions for improvement. 
 
Despite the large sample size, our study was highly 
feasible. The polling station appeared to be an ideal 
location to recruit participants for a brief research 
session. People appeared to be very willing to 
participate. This may be due to the brevity of the 
research session, but also to the societal relevance of 
the research topic. Voters easily understand that it is 
important to evaluate and optimize voting equipment. 
 
Our experiences raise some issues about the design of 
this type of usability test. The results show that most of 
the deviations we found were caused by the research 
design, and not by the voting equipment. The most 
problematic issue was that some of the participants 
seemed to forget the voting assignment that was given 
to them. For two reasons, however, we think it is 
important to work with voting assignments. First, it is 
the best guarantee that all voting options are included 
in a usability test. It seems plausible that voting on 
candidate number 1 of the first party will cause fewer 
usability challenges than voting on candidate number 
23 of the twentieth party. Second, it is the only way of 
having an unambiguous check whether or not 
participants voted correctly. To solve the participants’ 
memory problems, it may be an option to give them a 
reminder of the voting assignment on paper. 
 
A second remark pertains to the comparison of the 
voting machine and the paper ballot. The fact that all 
participants had just cast their vote in the real elections 
with the same Nedap voting machine may have worked 
to the advantage of the usability results of the voting 
machine. However, since the earlier voting session did 
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not include any feedback on the correctness of their 
votes, it seems less plausible that participants could 
have learned from mistakes they may have made in the 
real elections. More in general, however, the collection 
of usability data in the context of real elections raises 
questions about the relationship between the real 
task(s) and equipment and the task(s) and equipment 
used in the usability study. 
 
A third problematic aspect was the sometimes hectic 
context of the research. From time to time, participants 
had to wait in line for their turn, and started talking 
with each other. The pressure led to a few errors by the 
research assistants. On the other hand, however, the 
non-laboratory setting closely resembled the real voting 
conditions in the Netherlands. The research was 
probably as ecologically valid as a usability test of 
voting equipment can get. 
 
Practitioner’s Take away 
• It is important to conduct user research of voting 
equipment. The research may focus on a fine-
grained analysis of potential user problems or on 
an overall assessment of the usability of the voting 
equipment. It will be hard to serve both goals in 
one and the same study. 
 
• User research can effectively be conducted in the 
vicinity of polling stations. This makes it easy to 
design an ecologically valid research context. 
People also appear to be willing to participate in 
such a study, provided that it does not take very 
long. 
 
• It is important to clearly distinguish the test set-up 
from the real elections that take place in the same 
building. This can be done by clearly announcing 
the research with posters, by visually stressing the 
researchers’ affiliation, and by emphasizing the 
distinction in the instructions to the participants. 
 
• The best way to be able to include all voting 
options in the usability study and to be able to 
verify the correctness of participants’ votes is by 
using voting assignments. To avoid memory 
problems, it may be useful to support a voting 
assignment with a written note. 
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